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The  economic  growth  of  this  period  is  typically  considered  one  of  the  primary 
reasons  for  the  sharp  decline  in  the  U.S.  poverty  rate  over  that  decade.  In 
fact,  it was  during  this  decade  that  the  term  "trickling  down"  was  first  coined, 
to refer  to the  positive  effect  of economic  growth  on the  well-  being  of the poor 
(Anderson,  1964).  Estimates  based  on  data  from  the  1960s  and  1970s  have 
consistently  shown  a strong  negative  correlation  between  macroeconomic  expansion 
and  the  poverty  rate. 
Between  the  fourth  quarter  of 1982 and the  fourth  quarter  of 1990,  the U.S. 
experienced  its second  longest  economic  expansion.  After  the  sharp  recessi,on of 
1981/82,  the  poverty  rate  exceeded  15 percent  and  it would  have  been  reasonable 
to  expect  that  the  strong  expansion  that  followed  would  have  produced  a  sharp 
decline  in poverty.  This  did not  occur.  While  poverty  clearly  declined  over  the 
entire  period  of  the  expansion,  it  still  stood  at  12.8  percent  in  1989,  well 
above  its  historic  low  of  11.1  percent  in  1973,  and  at  about  the  same  level  as 
in  1980.  The  macroeconomic  expansion  did  not  bring  down  poverty  as  quickly  as 
historical  evidence  would  have  indicated.  In  1988,  for  instance,  when  the 
overall  economy  grew  by  more  than  4 percent,  poverty  fell  by  a  statistically 
insignificant  amount. 
This  paper  explores  the  unexpectedly  slow  decline  in poverty  that  occurred 
over  the  expansion  of  the  1980s.  The  next  section  presents  evidence  on  the 
"stickiness"  in the poverty  rate  in the past  decade,  compared  to earlier  decades. 
The  following  section  investigates  several  potential  non-earnings-related 
explanations  for  this  fact.  There  is  little  evidence  that  the  slowdown  in  the 
response  of  poverty  to  economic  growth  is due  to  problems  with  the  measurement 
of  poverty,  to  changes  in  transfer  policy  in  the  early  198Os,  to  the  regional 
distribution  of  the  poor  during  the  1980s  expansion,  or  to  changes  in  family 
composition  among  the  poor. 
The  final  section  of  the  paper  investigated  the  decreased  responsiveness 
of  income  and  earnings  to  the  macroeconomy  among  low-income  households  in  the 1980s.  A growing  body  of  literature  has  recently  began  to explore  the  widening 
in  wage  differentials  among  less-skilled  and  more  skilled  workers  over  the 
198Os.l  That  literature  indicates  that  substantial  real  wage  declines  occurred 
among  low-wage  workers  throughout  the  expansion  of the  198Os,  while  substantial 
real  wage  increases  occurred  among  higher-wage  workers.  These  trends  are clearly 
correlated  with  the  trends  in poverty.  Declining  real  wages  will  make  it harder 
for  low-income  families  to  escape  poverty.  The  point  of  this  paper  is  not  to 
describe  that  wage  decline  further,  but  to investigate  how  important  this  decline 
was  relative  to  other  factors  that  were  operating  at  the  bottom  of  the  income 
distribution.  , 
The  lower  responsiveness  of  poverty  to  economic  growth  is  not  ,due  to 
changes  in labor  market  responsiveness  over  the  1980s  expansion.  In fact,  labor 
market  involvement  was  more  responsive  during  the  1980s:  the  unemployment  rate 
fell more  rapidly,  and earners  in the bottom  quintile  of the population  increased 
their  work  effort  more  sharply  in  the  1980s  than  in  the  1960s.  The  lower 
responsiveness  of  income  among  low-income  households  to  the  economic  expansion 
of the  1980s  is entirely  due  to declining  real  wages,  which  offset  the  increase 
in  labor  market  effort,  resulting  in  slower  income  growth. 
The  implication  of these  results  is that  the changing  wage  structure  of the 
1980s  made  economic  growth  a far  less  effective  tool  for  reducing  poverty  than 
it was  in the  expansion  of the  1960s.  It is still  an open  question  whether  these 
trends  will  continue  into  the  1990s.  If  they  do,  economic  growth  cannot  be 
expected  to  produce  substantial  declines  in the  poverty  rate. 
I.  THE  CHANGING  RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN  THE  MACROECONOMY  AND  POVERTY 
In  1984  Alan  Blinder  and  I wrote  a paper  estimating  the  effect  of general 
macroeconomic  variables  on the poverty  rate  (Blank and Blinder,  1986).  Using  the 
official  data  on poverty,  we  regressed  the poverty  rate  against  a set  of control 
variables  for the macroeconomic  environment.  That  regression,  based  on data  from 
1959  to  1983,  is  presented  in  column  1 of  table  1.'  As  shown  at  the  bottom  of 
table  1, the  coefficients  indicate  that  in a steady  state  a 1 point  increases  in 
the male  unemployment  rate  (a measure  of core  unemployment  in the  economy)  would increase  the  poverty  rate  by  an almost  identical  0.98  points.  A 1 point  rise  in 
inflation  would  increase  poverty  by  a much  smaller  0.12  points.  A  1 point  rise 
in the  percent  of GNP  devoted  to government  transfers  would  decrease  the  poverty 
rate  by  about  half  a point. 
This  regression  equation,  based  on  the  historical  relationship  between 
poverty  and  macroeconomic  indicators,  can  be  used  to  forecast  poverty  for  the 
1980s.  Multiplying  the  regression  coefficients  from  column  1 of table  1 by  the 
actual  values  of  the  macroeconomic  variables  after  1983  results  in  a  series  of 
annual  poverty  rate  forecasts.  By  1989,  this  regression  equation  would  have 
predicted  a  poverty  rate  of  9.3  percent,  largely  due  to  a  sharp  decline  in 
Y 
unemployment  and  inflation  over  these  years.  In reality,  the  poverty  rate  was 
12.8  percent.  Figure  1  shows  this  effect,  with  a  plot  of  the  actual  poverty 
rates  from  1959  to  1989,  against  the  fitted  values  of  the  equation  in  column  1 
from  1959  to  1983,  and  the  forecast  values  from  1984  to  1989,  As  Figure  1 
indicates,  the  predicted  values  diverge  steadily  from  the  actual  poverty  rate 
throughout  the  expansion  of  the  1980s. 
Column  2  of  table  1  indicates  the  nature  of  this  divergence.  In  this 
column,  the  identical  regression  is calculated  using  data  from  1959  through  1989 
(that  is,  including  the  6  newly  available  observations.)  The  results  are 
astonishingly  different.  The coefficients  change  dramatically  with  the  addition 
of these  new  observations,  so that  the effects  of both  unemployment  and  inflation 
become  small  and  insignificant.  The  effect  of  transfers  as  a  share  of  GNP 
changes  sign. 
Column  3 of table  1 further  investigates  these  differences,  by adding  three 
additional  variables:  a dummy  variable,  equal  to  1 from  1983  on,  which  allows 
a shift  effect  in  the  general  level  of  poverty  over  the  expansion;  the  product 
of  this  dummy  variable  and  the  male  unemployment  rate,  which  allows  the 
coefficient  on unemployment  to differ  in the  1980s;  and the product  of this  dummy 
variable  and  transfers  as a percent  of GNP,  which  allows  the  coefficient  on this 
variable  to  differ  in  the  1980s.  The  result  is  a  set  of  coefficients  on  the 
original  variables  similar  to  those  found  in  column  1,  as  well  as  a  set  of 
3 additive  coefficients,  showing  how the effects  of these  variables  divergedduring 
the  expansion  of  the  1980s. 
Column  3  indicates  that  both  unemployment  and  transfers  appear  to  have 
"perverse"  effects  on poverty  over  the  1980s.  All  else  held  constant,  for every 
1 point  fall  in unemployment  after  1982,  poverty  increased  by  0.42 points.  After 
1982,  a  1 point  rise  in the  share  of transfers  in GNP  is associated  with  a 1.58 
point  rise  in  poverty.  This  exercise  indicates  the  difficulties  of  drawing 
causal  conclusions  from  regression  analysis.  The  negative  correlation  between 
unemployment  and  poverty  in  the  1980s  should  not  be  interpreted  to  imply  that 
rising  unemployment  in  the  1990s  will  decrease  poverty.  Rather,  it  is  more  ? 
likely  that  other  (unmeasured)  factors,  occurring  at  the  same  time  that 
unemployment  fell,  were  offsetting  the  unemployment  effects  during  the  198Os, 
resulting  in  a negative  coefficient.  The  question  of  this  paper  is  what  those 
other  unmeasured  effects  might  be. 
The  regressions  from  Blank  and  Blinder  focus  particularly  on  the  effects 
of  unemployment  and  inflation  on  the  poor.  A  simpler  way  of  observing  the 
changing  relationship  between  economic  growth  and  poverty  is  to  regress  the 
percent  change  in  poverty  against  the  percent  change  in  real  GNP.  Using 
available  poverty  rates3,  table  2  presents  coefficients  that  estimate  the 
percent  change  in  poverty  resulting  from  a  1  percent  change  in  GNP  in  three 
different  time  periods.  For  instance,  column  1 of  table  2  indicates  that  the 
poverty  rate  among  all  persons  decreased  by  2.53  percent  for  every  1 percent 
increase  in  GNP  over  the  196Os,  but  decreased  by  only  1.69  percent  for  every  1 
percent  increase  in  GNP  over  the  expansion  of  the  1980s. 
The  evidence  in table  2 indicated  that  the  lower  responsiveness  of poverty 
to  the  expansion  of  the  1980s  occurs  among  a  wide  range  of  groups  in  the 
population  and  is evident  among  both  those  whose  incomes  have  historically  been 
more  responsive  and  those  who  are generally  less  responsive  to the macroeconomy. 
Poverty  rates  calculated  among  families  (column  4)  show  a pattern  identical  to 
that  of  poverty  rates  among  individuals  (column  1).  Poverty  among  children 
(column  2)  is more  responsive  to  economic  growth  and  poverty  among  the  elderly 
4 (column  3)  is  less  responsive  than  is the  total  poverty  rate.  For  both  groups, 
however,  their  responsiveness  was  lower  in  the  1980s.  Female-headed  families 
(column  5)  show  a markedly  lower  responsiveness  to economic  growth  in both  time 
periods.4  Black  families  (column  6)  escaped  poverty  faster  than  other  groups 
when  the  economy  grew  in  the  196Os,  but  their  poverty  rate  has  shown  virtually 
no  responsiveness  to  the  economic  growth  of  the  1980s. 
It  is  worth  noting  that  for  most  of  these  groups,  poverty  is  also  less 
responsive  to  economic  growth  over  the  1970s  and  early  1980s  as well.  I do  not 
focus  on  this  fact  primarily  because  the  time  period  between  1970  and  1982  was 
a very  different  economic  period  than  the  1960s  and  the  latter  part  of the  1980s. 
The  thirteen  years  between  1970  and  1982  contained  four  business  cycles,  with 
five  years  of  negative  GNP  growth,  and  a  rapid  increase  in  both  inflation  and 
unemployment.  It  is perhaps  not  surprising  that  poverty  is  less  responsive  to 
short  and  sequential  upturns  and  downturns  in  the  economy. 
In contrast,  the expansion  of the  1960s  lasted  for over  nine  years,  and the 
expansion  of  the  1990s  lasted  for  almost  eight  years.  Table  3  indicates  how 
similar  these  periods  were,  focussing  on the  seven-year  periods  1963-69  and  1983- 
89,  the  two  periods  which  we  shall  use  extensively  in  the  rest  of  this  paper.' 
In  both  of  these  periods,  the  economy  experienced  sustained  and  continuous 
economic  growth.  As  table  3  indicates,  in  the  1960s  real  GNP  grew  by  34.7 
percent  over  this  period.  In the  198Os,  real  GNP  grew  by  a very  similar  30.1 
percent.  Similarly,  unemployment  fell  37.0 percent  over  these  seven  years  in the 
196Os,  while  it  fell  by  a slightly  higher  45.3  percent  in the  1980s.  Inflation 
rose  by  24.8  percent  in the  1960s  and  by  26.3  percent  in  the  1980s.  In  short, 
these  periods  are  quite  comparable  in  terms  of  their  general  macroeconomic 
trends.6  Since  my  interest  is in the  effect  of sustained  economic  growth  on the 
poverty  rate  and  the  income  of  low-income  households,  these  two  seven-year 
periods  provide  an  interesting  comparison. 
II.  INVESTIGATING  POSSIBLE  NON-EARNINGS-BELATED  HYPOTHESES 
The evidence  in tables  1 and 2 indicate  that  aggregate  poverty  rates  appear 
less  responsive  to  economic  growth  in  recent  years.  This  need  not  necessarily 
5 mean  that  incomes  among  any  group  are  actually  growing  more  slowly  in the  1980s. 
A variety  of possible  compositional  changes  or measurement  problems  could  cause 
the  effects  observed  above.  This  section  investigates  four  possible  hypotheses. 
The  approach  of  the  section  is  to  first  investigate  whether  these  issues  would 
have  affected  the  trend  in poverty  over  the  1980s.  If not,  it  is  assumed  that 
they  did  not  affect  the  responsiveness  of poverty  to  the macroeconomy.  If they 
affect  the  trend  in poverty,  then  their  impact  on  the  responsiveness  of poverty 
is  analyzed. 
A.  Problems  in  the  Poverty  Measurement:  The  Exclusion  of  In-kind  Incomes 
An  ongoing  controversy  over  the  appropriate  definition  of poverty  has  led 
, 
many  analysts  to  question  the  accuracy  of  current  poverty  definitions.',  It may 
be possible  that  the  seeming  differences  between  poverty  trends  in the  1980s  and 
earlier  decades  are due to growing  problems  in the measurement  of poverty,  rather 
than  any  real  changes  in  behavior  among  the  poor.  The  most  obvious  measurement 
problem  that  might  be  confounding  the  poverty  data  is the  exclusion  of  in-kind 
income  from  family  resources.'  In the  196Os,  most  current  in-kind  programs  were 
small  or  nonexistent,  but  these  programs  expanded  rapidly  in  the  following 
decade.  Official  income  statistics  do  not  include  the  resources  available  to 
families  from  in-kind  programs.  If this  income  were  counted,  poverty  rates  would 
be  lower.  If these  programs  expanded  during  the  macroeconomic  expansion  of the 
198Os,  family  resources  could  be  growing  faster  than  reported  income  and  the 
seeming  "unresponsiveness"  of  poverty  to  the  macroeconomy  could  be  simply  a 
byproduct  of  the  exclusion  of  in-  kind  income  from  the  data. 
Table  4 presents  the  changes  in  spending  per  person  in  the  two  major  in- 
kind  transfer  programs,  medicaid  and  food  stamps,  over  the  1980s.  Monthly  food 
stamp  benefits  per  recipient,  while  expanding  during  the  recession,  contract 
between  1983  and  1989,  indicating  that  poverty  would  not  have  fallen  any  faster 
over  the  expansion  if  food  stamps  were  included  in  the  income  statistics.  In 
contrast,  medicaid  expenditures  per  recipient  continued  to  rise  throughout  the 
198Os,  although  the  rate  of  increase  slowed  after  1983.'  There  is,  however, 
substantial  debate  over  whether  and  how  medical  services  should  be  counted  as 
6 part  of income.  It seems  clear  that  a dollar  in medical  services  received  is not 
equivalent  to  a dollar  in income.  Few  low-income  people,  if given  extra  income, 
would  spend  it on health  insurance.  For  these  reasons,  many  analysts  prefer  not 
to  impute  the  value  of medicaid  services  into  cash  inc0me.l' 
The  Bureau  of  the  Census  has,  for  several  years,  provided  unofficial 
estimates  of  poverty  with  in-kind  income  included  in  household  income.  A 
consistent  series  is  available  from  1979  through  1987.'l  Table  5  shows  the 
change  in poverty  between  1979  to  1983  and  1983  to  1987  for  the  official  poverty 
rate,  the  unofficial  poverty  rate  including  in-kind  food,  and  housing  benefits, 
and  the  unofficial  poverty  rate  including  in-kind  food,  housing,  and  medical 
benefits. 
The  results  are consistent  with  those  in table  4, indicating  that  no growth 
in  food  stamp  and  housing  benefits  occurred  during  the  expansion  of  the  1980s. 
The  change  in poverty  between  1983  and  1989  with  these  two  benefits  included  is 
identical  to  the  change  in  the  official  poverty  rate.  The  real  increase  in 
medicaid  expenditures  causes  an additional  drop  of only  0.1 point  in the poverty 
rate.  Thus,  the trends  in poverty  are virtually  identical  between  1983-87  in all 
three  columns.  The percentage  changes  in the  in-kind  poverty  rates  are  slightly 
higher  because  they  are  calculated  on a lower  base.  The evidence  in tables  3 and 
4  provide  little  support  for  the  hypothesis  that  poverty  would  have  declined 
substantially  faster  during  the  expansion  of  the  1980s  had  a fuller  measure  of 
family  income  been  used.  Thus,  the  differential  responsiveness  of  poverty  to 
economic  growth  over  the  expansion  of  the  1980s  is  probably  not  due  to  the 
omission  of  in-kind  benefits  in  the  calculation  of poverty  rates. 
B.  The  Regional  Location  of  the  Poor  During  the  Expansion 
There  was  an  unusually  high  degree  of  regional  variation  in  the  economy 
during  the  expansion  of  the  1980s.  For  instance,  in  1988,  the  coefficient  of 
variation  in unemployment  rates  across  states  reached  a 20-year  peak,  indicating 
that  there  were  quite  large  differences  between  unemployment  levels  across 
states."  While  New  England  and  the  mid-Atlantic  states  saw  enormous  growth  in 
employment  and  business  activity,  the  industrial  Midwest  remained  sluggish  well 
7 into  the  mid-1980s. 
If the poor  were  disproportionately  located  in the  regions  and  states  that 
experienced  lower  growth,  their  ability  to  expand  income  might  have  been  more 
limited  than  aggregate  economic  growth  would  indicate.  In  other  words,  the 
seeming  non-responsiveness  of poverty  could  be due  to the  regional  distribution 
of the poor  and  reflect  dispersion  in regional  growth  experiences  rather  than  any 
aggregate  decline  in the overall  responsiveness  of poverty  to economic  expansion. 
To  investigate  this  question  I  use  the  March  1979  and  1989  Current 
Population  Survey  (CPS) data.  This  provides  a random  sample  of the  entire  U.S. 
population.  Rather  than  focussing  on  individuals,  I focus  on  what  I will  call 
, 
family  units,  which  is  essentially  the  combined  sum  of  families  and  unrelated 
individuals  as  defined  by  the  Census  Bureau.  A  family  unit  consists  of  all 
related  persons  who  live  in the  same  household.  Households  with  two  unrelated 
single  roommates  consist  of two  family  units.  Households  with  three  generations 
consist  of  one  family  unit.  A  family  unit  is  assumed  to  be  the  appropriate 
economic  entity  for  pooling  income.  Throughout  the  rest  of  this  paper,  all 
poverty  counts  and  income  statistics  will  use  family  units  as the  observational 
level  at  which  the  data  is  analyzed.13 
Table  6 presents  the distribution  of poor  and non-poor  family  units  across 
the  nine  Census  regions  for  1979  and  1989.  While  a  slightly  higher  percentage 
of  the  poor  live  in  the  East  South  Central,  West  South  Central,  and  South 
Atlantic  regions,  and  a slightly  lower  percentage  live  in the  other  regions,  the 
distributions  are  quite  similar  in  both  years.  As  the  bottom  of  table  6 
indicates,  a chi-squared  test  of  equality  between  the  two  distributions  cannot 
reject  the  hypothesis  that  they  are  identical  in  both  years.  A  similar  test, 
based  on the  distribution  of the  poor  and  non-poor  across  states,  also  fails  to 
reject  the  hypothesis  that  the  state  distributions  are  identical  in both  years. 
Given  the evidence  in table  6, it is possible  to reject  the  theory  that  the 
regional  distribution  of the  poor  gave  them  less  of an opportunity  to experience 
income  growth  in  the  1980s.  Over  this  decade,  the  poor  and  the  non-poor  were 
distributed  in  essentially  the  same  way  across  regions. 
8 There  is,  however,  a  possibility  that  the  important  geographical 
distinction  between  the  poor  and  the  non-poor  is  not  their  state  of  regional 
location,  but  their  urban  location.  Increasing  attention  in  recent  years  has 
focused  on  the  problems  of  low-income  families  and  individuals  living  in 
concentrated  areas  of  urban  poverty  (Wilson,  1987),  often  called  "underclass" 
areas.  If increasing  numbers  of  the  poor  were  located  in urban  ghettoes  in the 
1980s  than  in  the  196Os,  and  if  it  is  harder  to  find  employment  and  escape 
poverty  in  these  areas,  then  this  could  have  lowered  the  responsiveness  of 
poverty  to  economic  growth. 
While  it is not  possible  to test  they  hypothesis  thoroughly  in this  paper, 
, 
table  7  provides  data  on  the  urban  location  of  the  poor  and  non-poor  that 
indicates  there  is  little  evidence  of  large  shifts  in urban  location  among  the 
poor  over  these  years.  Column  1 of Table  7 indicates  that  the  share  of the  poor 
living  in  central  city  locations  during  the  expansion  of  the  1960s  was  between 
33 and  34 percent.  The  share  of the poor  living  in central  city  locations  during 
the  expansion  of  the  1980s  was  a  virtually  identical  35  percent.  Column  2 
indicates  that  the  share  of  the  poor  living  outside  central  cities  but  within 
major  metropolitan  areas  increased  somewhat  between  the  1960s  and  1980s.  In 
contrast,  among  the  non-poor,  the  share  in central  cities  (column  3) drops  from 
35  percent  in  the  early  1960s  to  25  percent  by  the  end  of  the  1980s.  Thus,  a 
trend  away  from  central  city  residence  occurs  among  the  non-poor.  The  non-poor 
also  show  an increased  share  living  in metropolitan  areas  outside  central  cities 
(column  4). 
There  is  little  evidence  in table  7 that  more  poor  were  caught  in central 
city  locations  in  the  1980s  than  in the  1960s.  The  constant  share  of  the  poor 
population  in urban  locations  over  these  decreased  suggests  that  changing  urban 
location  is  not  a primary  cause  of  the  decreased  responsiveness  of  the  poor  to 
the macroeconomy  of the  1980s.  This  does  not,  however,  rule  out  the possibility 
that  factors  related  to urban  location  caused  the  slower  decline  in poverty  over 
that  decade.  First,  it  is  possible  that  central  city  locations  became  less 
economically  viable  for  residents,  particularly  as the non-poor  population  moved 
9 elsewhere.  Thus,  central  city  residents  might  be more  disadvantaged  in the  1980s 
than  they  were  in  the  1960s  in  terms  of  their  access  to  jobs.  Second,  it  is 
possible  that  "central  city  location"  is too  aggregate  a measure,  and  that  the 
correct  measure  should  be "living  in areas  of concentrated  urban  poverty."  There 
is  evidence  that  the  percent  of  poor  living  in  areas  of  high  poverty  increased 
between  1970  and  1980  (rickets  and  Sawhill,  1988).  Unfortunately,  I lack  any 
data  on  economic  growth  and  expansion  in  central  city  versus  non-central  city 
locations,  much  less  on such  changes  within  particularly  poor  central  city  areas. 
If such  effects  are  occurring,  they  will  show  up as part  of the  earnings-related 
effects  measured  in the  next  section  of  the  paper. 
C.  Did  Policy  Chanqes  in  the  1980s  offset  Economic  Growth? 
In  the  first  two  years  of  the  Reagan  Administration,  there  were  major 
changes  in  transfer  programs,  particularly  those  aimed  at  the  poor.  Some  of 
these  changes  affected  the  operation  and  administration  of  the  programs,  while 
others  limited  eligibility  and  benefits.  It  is  sometimes  argued  that  poverty 
stayed  unduly  high  in the  1980s  because  of the  policy  changes  in these  programs 
in  the  early  part  of  the  decade. 
While  these  program  changes  may  have  contributed  to  the  sharp  rises  in 
poverty  during  the  recession  of  the  early  198Os,  it  is  more  difficult  to 
understand  why  such  changes  would  have  lessened  the  responsiveness  of  the  poor 
to  economic  growth  over  the  expansion  of the  mid-to-late  1980s.  In particular, 
if such  cuts  reduced  the availability  of public  transfer  funds,  standard  economic 
theory  would  predict  that  this  should  have  increased  labor  supply.  As employment 
expanded  in  the  198Os,  one  might  have  expected  greater  responsiveness  to  the 
labor  market  environment  after  the  cuts  (with less  non-earned  income  to  rely  on) 
than  before  the  cuts. 
In  addition,  there  is  also  evidence  that  many  of  the  federal  cuts  in 
funding  for  state-local  programs  did  not  fully  occur,  because  stated  made  up the 
losses.  A  variety  of  federal  categorical  programs,  many  of  them  particularly 
aimed  at  low-income  families,  were  abolished  and  their  dollars  diverted  into 
newly-created  block  grants  to  the  states,  with  less  money  in these  block  grants 
10 than  had  been  provided  earlier  through  the  programs.  Nathan  and  Doolittle 
(19871,  in  an  extensive  study  of  the  effects  of  the  1981  Federal  cuts  on  the 
services  provided  by  states,  found  that  few  of  the  programs  rolled  into  these 
block  grants  experienced  substantial  cuts,  as  states  shifted  funds  from  other 
programs,  or  (as the  recession  of the  early  1980s  ended)  put  new  state  revenues 
into  these  programs. 
On  the  other  hand,  Nathan  and  Doolittle  do  note  that  the  cuts  in  Aid  to 
Families  with  Dependent  Children  (AFDC),  the  primary  welfare  program  available 
to  low-income  families,  did  get  passed  on directly  to  recipients.  I explore  the 
effects  of  these  cuts  on poverty  rates  between  1978  and  1988  by  again  using  the 
, 
March  1979  and  1989  CPS  data.14  In 
population  reporting  receipt  of AFDC, 
rate  and  poverty  gapI  in  1987  (column 
4,  I use  the  eligibility  and  benefit 
table  8  I  tabulate  the  percent,  of  the 
the  dollars  they  receive,  and  the  poverty 
1) and  1988  (column  3).  In columns  2 and 
rules  of  the  AFDC  program  for  these  two 
years  in  each  state  to  simulate  the  percent  estimated  to  be  eligible  for  AFDC, 
the  dollars  they  would  receive,  and  the  poverty  rate  and  poverty  gap  under  this 
simulation.  In the  final  column,  I simulate  the  effect  on  AFDC  recipiency  and 
poverty  in  1988  if the  1978  programs  were  in  effect. 
Before  discussing  the  results,  let  me  note  several  caveats  about  the 
simulations  performed  in  table  8.  First,  the  CPS  data  provides  information  on 
public  assistance  received,  which  is  a  more  inclusive  category  than  AFDC.16 
This  is  one  reason  why  the  simulations  in  row  one  show  fewer  families  on  AFDC 
than  actually  report  receiving  income  from  it.  In the  second  part  of  table  8, 
which  calculates  equivalent  numbers  among  female-headed  households,  this  pattern 
is  not  present,  which  is  reassuring  since  the  vast  amount  of  public  assistance 
income  among  these  households  is AFDC  income. 
Second,  the  simulation  of 1978  programs  on 1988  data  ignores  all potential 
labor  supply  changes  that  AFDC  program  changes  might  induce.  In other  words,  the 
simulation  in  column  5 takes  all  income  other  than  AFDC  income  as  fixed  (and by 
default,  takes  labor  supply  as  fixed.)  It  is  not  clear  whether  the  net  effect 
of the  program  cuts  was  to  increase  or decrease  labor  supply.  Among  those  whose 
11 AFDC  was  reduced  or ended,  one might  expect  an increase  in labor  supply.  But  the 
increase  in tax  rates  on the  program  is generally  agreed  to have  decreased  labor 
supply  among  ongoing  AFDC  recipients  (Moffitt,  1986).  If  one  believes  that 
overall  labor  supply  increased  as the  availability  of AFDC  income  fell,  then  the 
simulated  effect  of  1978  programs  on  the  poverty  rate  in  1988  produces  an 
underestimate;  had  the  1978  programs  continued  throughout  the  decade,  labor 
supply  would  have  been  lower  and  poverty  higher. 
The  simulations  in columns  2 and  4 of table  8 aresimilar  to such  simulation 
results  elsewhere  in the literature  (for instance,  see Ruggles  and Michel,  1987). 
While  the  number  reporting  receipt  of AFDC  income  is reasonably  well  estimated, 
, 
the  simulations  allocate  more  AFDC  dollars  to  these  women  than  they  report 
receiving.l'  The  poverty  rates  resulting  from  the  simulations  are  virtually 
identical  to  reported  poverty  rates,  not  surprising  since  the  AFDC  program  in 
most  states  is too  limited  to move  anyone  out of poverty,  but  poverty  gaps  in the 
simulations  are  smaller. 
The  effect  of changes  in the  AFDC  program  can be  seen  by comparing  columns 
4 and  5.  Column  5 of table  8 indicates  that  if the  1978  programs  were  available 
in  1988,  the  percent  of  the  population  on  AFDC  would  be  virtually  identical  to 
the  percent  who  are  simulated  to  be  on  AFDC  (column  4)  under  the  actual  1988 
programs.  The  amount  of  money  available  to  these  recipients  would  be  larger, 
however.  Poverty  rates  would  be  lower  by  only  a very  small  amount;  poverty  gaps 
would  fall  by  a  few  hundred  dollars.  If  the  1978  programs  were  in  effect  in 
1988,  the  poor  would  surely  be  somewhat  better  off,  according  to  these 
simulations,  because  they  would  have  more  AFDC  dollars  available.  But  the 
overall  poverty  rate  would  be  largely  unaffected  by  this  change. 
The  implication  of  table  8  is  that  the  cuts  in  AFDC,  the  primary  cash 
income  program  to  experience  cuts  in the  early  198Os,  had  little  effect  on  the 
overall  trend  in poverty  over  the  1980s.  Poverty  would  not have  been  appreciably 
lower  in  1988  had  AFDC  remained  unchanged.  In  addition,  there  is  little 
theoretical  reason  to  believe  that  these  cuts  would  have  decreased  the 
responsiveness  of  the  poor  to  the  macroeconomy. 
12 D.  The  Chanqinq  Demoqraphic  Composition  of  Family  Units 
Table  2 indicated  that  not  all groups  among  the poor  are equally  responsive 
to  economic  growth.  For  instance,  poverty  among  female-headed  households  and 
elderly  households  is  less  affected  by  the  growth  in  overall  employment 
opportunities.  This  implies  that  some  of the  shift  in responsiveness  during  the 
1980s  may  have  been  due  to  shifting  demographic  composition  among  the  poor. 
Since  more  of the  poor  were  in female-headed  households  in the  1980s  than  in the 
1960s  and  197Os,  aggregate  poverty  could  be  less  responsive  to  GNP  growth,  not 
because  any group  had become  less  responsive,  but because  those  family  types  with 
lower  responsiveness  had  increased  their  share  of  the  poor  population. 
_j 
To  investigate  the  extent  to  which  changing  demographic  composition  has 
affected  poverty  rates,  I  again  turn  to  the  March  CPS  data.  This  data  is 
available  on  tape  from  1964  through  199O.l*  Since  data  on  income  and  poverty 
are based  on households'  experiences  in the previous  year,  this  provides  me with 
continuous  annual  information  from  1963  through  1989.  As before,  I investigate 
poverty  and  income  among  family  units. 
A  sense  of  the  importance  of  the  demographic  composition  of  family  units 
to  the  poverty  rate  can  be  seen  in  table  9.  Column  1 of  table  9  reports  the 
actual  changes  in poverty  rates  among  all  family  units.  Over  the  1960s  poverty 
falls  by  over  7 points,  while  it  rises  by  0.37  of  a point  over  the  1980s.19 
In  column  2  I  recalculate  poverty  rates,  holding  the  demographic 
composition  of family  units  constant  at their  1964  levels.  In particular,  I hold 
constant  the  population  shares  of  six  groups:  single  female  heads  with  other 
relatives  in  the  family  unit,  single  male  heads  with  other  relatives,  married 
couples  with  other  relatives,  married  couples  living  alone,  single  females  living 
alone,  and  single  males  living  alone."  Column  2 therefore,  indicates  what  the 
change  in poverty  rates  would  have  been  had  the  demographic  composition  of  the 
population  remained  constant.  Column  3 reports  the  difference  between  column  2 
and  column  1,  which  is  essentially  the  change  in  poverty  rates  that  occurred 
solely  because  of  the  change  in demographic  composition. 
Column  2 indicates  that  poverty  would  have  fallen  more  rapidly  (or risen 
13 more  slowly)  in  each  of  the  last  three  decades  had  the  composition  of  the 
population  remained  unchanged.  In  particular,  poverty  was  almost  one  point 
higher  (0.88)  in  1969  because  of  shifts  toward  poorer  family  types  between  1963 
and  1969.  Poverty  was  over  one point  higher  (1.39)  by the  end  of the  197Os,  when 
these  demographic  shifts  occurred  at  a relatively  faster  rate.  Over  the  198Os, 
these  shifts  continued  to  increase  poverty,  but  only  by  about  one-third  as much 
as  over  the  1970s. 
Table  9 indicates  that  demographic  shifts  affected  the  level  and  trend  of 
the  poverty  rate  over  the  past  three  decades,  but  does  not  provide  direct 
evidence  on  their  effect  on  the  responsiveness  of  poverty  to  macroeconomic 
growth.  Table  10 explores  this  question  more  closely,  using  the  same  data  from 
the  CPS  from  1963  through  1989.  In table  10 I report  the  results  of a series  of 
regressions  of  the  form 
(1) PR,,I-PR,_,,I  = Cr,*PCGNP,  + a,*PCGNP,  + a,*PCGNP,, 
where  PCGNP,  = percent  change  in  real  GNP  foe  years  1963-1969,  0  otherwise; 
PCGNP,  = percent  change  in  real  GNP  for  years  1970-1982,  0  otherwise; 
PCGNP,  = percent  change  in  real  GNP  for  years  1983-1989,  0  otherwise: 
and  PR,,i represents  the  poverty  rate  for  time  t and  group  i.'l 
Columns  1  and  2  of  table  10  report  the  coefficients  a,  and  a3  for  all  family 
units  and  for  the  six  underlying  demographic  groups.  Each  coefficient  can  be 
interpreted  as  the  change  in  the  level  of poverty  that  occurs  with  a  1 percent 
increase  GNP  in the  indicated  time  period.  Columns  3 and  4 use  the  change  in the 
share  of family  units  below  two times  the poverty  line  as the dependent  variable, 
which  I  will  refer  to  as  the  "near-poverty  rate."  The  results  in  table  10 
indicate  the  responsiveness  of  the  poverty  rate  and  near-poverty  rate  to  the 
economic  expansion  of  the  1960s  and  the  expansion  of  the  1980s." 
For  all  family  units,  a one  percent  increase  in  real  GNP  reduces  poverty 
by  one-fourth  of  a point  (-0.26)  between  1963  and  1969,  but  reduces  poverty  by 
less  than one-tenth  of a point  (-0.09)  between  1983  and 1989.  The same pattern 
14 occurs  for  the  near-poverty  rate  as  well.  The  difference  in  responsiveness 
between  different  demographic  groups  can  be  seen  in  rows  2 through  7.  Single 
males  and  females  living  alone  show  the  biggest  point  changes  in poverty  as the 
economy  grows  in  the  196Os.=  All  groups  show  substantially  lower 
responsiveness  to  GNP  growth  in  the  1980s. 
The  bottom  row  of  table  10  estimates  the  same  regression  with  a  new 
dependent  variable:  I create  a "constant-population-weight  poverty  rate"  holding 
the  demographic  composition  of  each  of  these  six  groups  constant  at  their 
starting  level  in the  1964  data.  (This  is the  same  variable  whose  poverty  rate 
changes  are  reported  in column  2 of table  9.)  The  coefficients  in this  last  row 
, 
vary  little  from  the  coefficients  in  the  first  row.  In  both  regressions,  the 
responsiveness  of poverty  to GNP  falls  by  about  two-thirds  between  the  1960s  and 
the  1980s.  This  implies  that  the  shifting  demographic  composition  of  poverty, 
while  it  has  affected  the  underlying  poverty  rate,  has  had  little  differential 
effect  on  its  responsiveness  to  the  macroeconomic  expansion  of  the  1980s. 
Table  11  verifies  this  by  estimating  the  reduced  responsiveness  to  GNP 
growth  indicated  by the  equations  in table  10 among  the  overall  poverty  rate  and 
the  constant-demographics  poverty  rate.  Row  1,  column  1  indicates  that  the 
regression  for  all  family  units  estimates  that  poverty  fell  2.2  points  between 
1983  and  1989.  If,  however,  poverty  had  been  as  responsive  over  these  years  as 
it  was  during  a time  of  similar  growth  in  the  196Os,  we  would  have  expected  it 
to  fall  by  6.0  points.  The  difference  indicates  that  poverty  was  3.9  points 
higher  by  the  end  of  the  1980s  due  to  its  reduced  responsiveness  to  aggregate 
economic  growth.  Had  the  demographic  composition  of  the  poverty  population 
remained  unchanged,  poverty  would  have  been  3.7 points  higher  by  the  end  of the 
1980s  (6.1-2.4).  This  indicates  that  0.2 points  in decreased  responsiveness  was 
due  to the  changing  demographics  of the poor  population.  As the  bottom  of table 
11  indicates,  this  is  4.4  percent  of  the  overall  decline  in  the  reduced 
responsiveness  of  the  poverty  rate. 
In  short,  the  changing  demographic  composition  among  the  poor  has  had 
almost  no  effect  on  the  making  poverty  "stickier"  over  the  1980s.  Less  than  5 
15 percent  of the  reduced  responsiveness  of the poverty  rate  to  real  GNP  growth  can 
be  explained  by  the  changing  composition  of  family  types. 
This  section  indicates  that  none  of  the  four  possible  hypotheses 
investigated  here  explain  the  unexpectedly  slow  decline  in  poverty  over  the 
1980s.  Neither  the  omission  of  in-kind  income  from  the  poverty  statistics,  the 
change  in AFDC  program  rules,  or the  distribution  of the  poor  across  regions  has 
affected  the  relative  trends  in  poverty  over  the  1980s.  Changing  demographic 
composition  among  the  poor,  while  it has  affected  both  the  level  and  the  trend 
in  poverty  over  the  past  three  decades,  has  had  little  effect  on  the 
responsiveness  of  poverty  to  the  overall  macroeconomy. 
1 
III.  EXPLORING  THE  RESPONSIVENESS  OF  EARNINGS  TO  THE  MACROECONOMY 
The evidence  above  suggests  that  there  may  have  been  a real  decrease  in the 
responsiveness  of  earnings  and  other  income  components  to  macroeconomic  growth 
among  the  poor.  This  section  explores  that  possibility  further. 
Much  of the  literature  on the  responsiveness  of the  income  distribution  to 
the macroeconomy  indicates  that  the  income  distribution  in the United  States  has 
historically  narrowed  in times  of economic  expansion,  at least  in the post-World 
War  II  era.  The  primary  reason  why  the  poor  "catch  up"  in  economic  booms  is 
expanded  employment  opportunities.  The  incidence  of  unemployment,  non- 
employment,  and  part-time  employment  is heavily  skewed  toward  the  bottom  of the 
income  distribution;  when  employment  grows  it  is  the  unemployed,  non-employed, 
and part-time  employed  who  are most  able  to take  advantage  of that  growth  (Blank 
and  Blinder,  or  Gramlich  and  Laren,  1984).  Persons  in  the  upper  half  of  the 
income  distribution  who  are  already  working  full-time  have  little  opportunity  to 
expand  their  labor  market  involvements  in a boom  (although,  of course,  other  non- 
working,  unemployed  or part-time  employed  family  members  can  always  expand  work 
hours.)  Thus,  incomes  among  the poor  typically  grow  faster  in boom  times  because 
of  increased  labor  market  involvements. 
Evidence  on wage  changes  over  the  business  cycle  are  more  mixed.  Earlier 
empirical  evidence  based  on wage  data  from  the  194Os,  195Os,  and  1960s  seems  to 
indicate  that  wages  were  largely  non-cyclical,  but  evidence  from  the  1970s  and 
16 early  1980s  indicates  mild  pro-cyclicality  in the  overall  level  of wages  (Blank, 
1990,  or  Keane,  Moffitt  and  Runkle,  1988).  Evidence  on  the  relative 
responsiveness  of wages  among  different  groups  in the  income  distribution  is more 
limited.  Evidence  based  primarily  on  1970s  data  seems  to  indicate  that  wages 
changed  little  with  the  cycle  for  low-income  groups  during  that  time  period 
(Blank,  1989),  but  one  might  expect  that  a period  of  sustained  economic  growth, 
particularly  if it is related  to underlying  productivity  growth,  would  result  in 
real  wage  gains. 
Note  that  I cannot  explore  the changing  responsiveness  of income  and income 
components  to  economic  growth  by  looking  at  changes  among  the  poor  and,the  non- 
poor.  Because  the  poverty  line  is  a  fixed  absol~ te  dollar  amount  (it changes 
only  with  the  consumer  price  index),  the  family  units  below  the  poverty  line  are 
a  constantly  changing  group.  As  income  expands,  the  poor  become  increasingly 
selected  toward  the  least-skilled  and/or  least-employable.  Therefore,  exploring 
labor  market  involvements  among  the poor  over  the expansion  willmixtogetherthe 
real  effects  of  the  expansion  with  the  changing  selectively  of  who  is  poor. 
Therefore,  in  this  section,  rather  than  focussing  on  the  poor,  per  se,  I will 
focus  on the  different  quintiles  and deciles  in the  income  distribution.  I will 
look particularly  at the responsiveness  of income  and income  components  among  the 
bottom  two  deciles  (the bottom  10 percent  and the  lo-20  percentiles  of the  income 
distribution)  to  investigate  the  effects  of macroeconomic  growth  on  low-income 
households.  The  bottom  decile  is  composed  of  100  percent  poor  family  units  in 
almost  all  time  periods,  and  reflects  the  experiences  of  the  poorest  persons  in 
the  population.  The  second  decile  is composed  of between  30 to  40 percent  poor 
family  units  (it  varies  across  years)  and  reflects  the  experiences  of  the 
"better-off"  among  the poor  and  of the near-poor.  Changes  among  these  two groups 
will  be  compared  with  the  changes  occurring  in the  upper  four  quintiles  (groups 
between  the  20-40,  40-60,  60-80  and  80-100  percentiles  in  the  income 
distribution.) 
A.  Responsiveness  of  Income  and  Income  Components  to  Economic  Growth 
Table  12 investigates  the  responsiveness  of different  components  of income 
17 to  the  macroeconomy  among  different  income  groups  over  the  1960s  and  the  1980s. 
The  estimated  equations  in  table  12  are  in  the  same  format  as  equation  1;  the 
dependent  variable  is indicated  at the  top  of each  column.  Columns  1 and  2 show 
the  level  change  in total  income  that  results  from  a 1 percent  increase  in real 
GNP  between  1963-69  and  1983-89,  respectively.  Among  the  bottom  two  deciles, 
total  income  rises  only  about  one-third  as  fast  in the  1980s  in  response  to GNP 
growth  as  it  does  in  the  1960s.  Similar  patterns  of  somewhat  slower  growth  in 
income  during  the  1980s  are  evident  among  the  middle  three  quintiles  as  well. 
Income  among  the top quintile  was  far more  responsive  to economic  growth  over  the 
1980s. 
, 
Columns  3  and  4  look  at  the  earnings  of  the  head  of  the  family  unit.24 
Responsiveness  of earnings  is lower  among  all groups  in the  1980s  expansion.  For 
all  groups  except  the  top  quintile,  it  is  the  decreased  responsiveness  of 
earnings  which  is primarily  responsible  for the decreased  responsiveness  of total 
income  to  economic  growth. 
Columns  5 and  6 investigate  the  responsiveness  of the  earnings  of spouses 
to economic  growth.  These  numbers  are  harder  to  interpret,  since  major  changes 
in the propensity  of married  women  to work  occur  over  this  time  period  and almost 
surely  are  confounded  with  these  coefficients  on  GNP  growth.  Among  the  bottom 
two  deciles  there  appears  to  be  little  difference  in  the  responsiveness  of 
spouse's  earnings  between  the  two  time  periods.  Thus,  this  variable  does  not 
seem  too  important  in explaining  differences  in the  responsiveness  of aggregate 
income  for  low-income  families. 
Finally,  columns  7  and  8  look  at  the  responsiveness  of  the  residual 
category  "other  income"  to economic  growth.  This  includes  all  sources  of income 
other  than  primary  and  spouse  earnings,  and  as  a result  it  is  a very  aggregate 
and  not  very  informative  category."  For  the  bottom  two  deciles,  this  category 
is  highly  composed  of  transfer  income  (public  and  private);  for  top  quintile 
groupsI  it contains  more  dividend,  interest,  and  rental  income.  Only  among  the 
top  quintile  does  this  category  appear  to  show  substantial  responsiveness  to 
economic  growth.  Among  the  other  groups,  this  category  is small  relative  to the 
18 changes  in  earnings  of  the  head. 
The  evidence  in table  12 indicates  that  most  of the  slowdown  in the  growth 
of aggregate  income  among  poor  and  near-poor  income  groups  occurs  because  of the 
slowdown  in the  growth  of earnings  among  the  head  of  family  units.  Thus,  it is 
to  this  issue  that  we  turn  next. 
B.  The  Responsiveness  of  Labor  Market  Involvements  vs  Waqes. 
Table  13  looks  at  the  relative  responsiveness  of  four  different  measures 
of  labor  market  involvement  among  family  unit  heads.  Columns  1 and  2  indicate 
that  the  decrease  in  the  probability  of  unemployment  over  the  past  year  was 
somewhat  larger  during  the  economic  growth  of the  1980s  than  during  the economic 
1 
growth  of  the  196Os,  although  these  numbers  are  small  and  poorly  determined. 
Thus,  unemployment  appears  slightly  more  responsive  to  economic  growth  in  the 
1980s  than  in  the  1960s.  This  pattern  occurs  for  all  groups. 
Similarly,  columns  3  and  4  investigate  the  responsiveness  of  the 
probability  that  a  family  unit  head  is employed  over  the  past  year.  Among  the 
bottom  two  deciles,  this  probability  is unchanged  or increases  slightly  with  GNP 
growth  in the  1980s.  For  the  upper  four  quintiles,  and  for  the  population  as a 
whole,  the  probability  of  unemployment  appears  slightly  less  responsive  to 
economic  growth  in the  1980s. 
Columns  5  and  6  investigate  the  annual  weeks  of  work  among  those  who 
work.26  For  the  top  four  quintiles  there  is little  change  in weeks  of work  over 
the  cycle  in  either  period.  For  the  bottom  two  deciles,  weeks  of  work  grow 
substantially  faster  during  the  1980s  than  during  the  1960s  expansion. 
Similarly,  columns  7  and  8  indicate  that  the  probability  that  the  head  is 
employed  part-time  over  the  year  is  as  responsive  in  both  expansions,  except 
among  the  bottom  two  deciles  whose  part-time  probabilities  decline  faster  with 
the  expansion  of  the  1980s. 
In  short,  for  the  poorest  20  percent  of  the  population,  labor  market 
involvement  is generally  more  responsive  to economic  growth  throughout  the  1980s 
than  it was  in the  1960s:  unemployment  and part-time  work  fall  more  rapidly  with 
growth  in GNP,  while  hours  of work  rise  more  quickly.  For  wealthier  quintiles, 
19 the difference  in responsiveness  between  these  two time  periods  is less  striking. 
There  is  little  in  table  13  to  indicate  that  poverty  should  be  less 
responsive  to  economic  growth  over  the  1980s  than  it  was  during  the  1960s.  In 
fact,  based  on  these  measures  of  labor  market  involvement,  table  13 would  lead 
us to predict  that  poverty  should  have  fallen  faster  in the  198Os,  as the poorest 
groups  responded  more  strongly  to  labor  market  opportunities. 
Earned  income  among  family  unit  heads  is the  product  of weeks  worked,  the 
probability  of working,  and  the  weekly  wage.  If the  probability  of working  and 
the  weekly  wage.  If  the  probability  of  working  and  the  weekly  wage  expanded 
faster  in  the  1980s  than  in  the  196Os,  but  earned  income  grew  less  fast,  then 
, 
changes  in  the  responsiveness  of  weekly  wages  to  macroeconomic  growth  must  be 
responsible.  Note  that  I have  no direct  information  on  wage  rates  in this  data 
set,  but  I can estimate  weekly  wages  using  heads'  earnings  divided  by the product 
of  the  probability  of  working  times  weekly  hours  worked."  But  there  is 
necessarily  a  lot  of  noise  in  this  estimate."  Therefore,  I  do  not  get  very 
precise  estimates  of  the  effect  of  real  GNP  growth  on  weekly  wages.  There  are 
some  suggestive  patterns  in  the  data, 
insignificant. 
however,  although  they  are  largely 
Table  14 provides  estimates  of the  responsiveness  of  real  weekly  wages  to 
GNP  growth.  During  the  196Os,  real  wages  rose with  the expanding  economy  for all 
groups.  For  instance,  the  bottom  decile  experienced  about  a  $2  increase  in 
weekly  wages  for  every  1  percent  increase  in  GNP,  while  the  second  decile 
experienced  a  $1  increase.  In  the  198Os,  however,  the  estimated  coefficients 
indicate  that  real  wages  for  these  two  groups  actually  decrease  as  the  economy 
grows  (although  these  coefficients  are  insignificantly  different  from  zero.)  In 
short,  there's  no  evidence  at  all  of  any  responsiveness  in real  wages  among  the 
bottom  two  deciles,  and  only  a small  effect  among  the  second  quintile.  In fact, 
real  wages  fall  for  these  groups  during  many  years  in the  1980s.  In  cant rast, 
among  the  top  quintile  weekly  wages  expand  more  rapidly  with  the  economy  of  the 
1980s  than  the  economy  of  the  1960s.  This  dramatic  difference  in  the 
responsiveness  of  real  wages  among  different  income  quintiles  over  the  1980s 
20 matches  the  results  in  research  cited  above  that  reports  widening  real  wages 
among  different  groups  in  the  income  distribution. 
The  story  from  tables  12,  13, and  14 is clear:  For  the  bottom  two  deciles 
of  the  income  distribution,  the  decreased  responsiveness  of  total  income  to 
economic  growth  occurred  primarily  because  of  the  decreased  responsiveness  of 
head's  earnings  to  economic  growth.  This  in turn  was  due  entirely  to  the  non- 
responsiveness  of  real  weekly  wages  to  economic  growth  among  primary  earners. 
Indeed,  labor  market  involvement  among  the  bottom  20  percent  expanded  more 
rapidly  in  the  1980s  than  in  the  1960s.  Had  wages  risen  with  the  macroeconomy 
as  they  did  the  196Os,  poverty  would  have  fallen  faster  than  in  the  earlier 
, 
decade.  Of  course,  had  wages  grown  for  low-income  workers  over  the  198Os,  they 
might  not  have  needed  to  expand  their  labor  market  involvement  as much  as  they 
did.  In  reality,  however,  real  wages  declined  over  the  1980s  for  this  group, 
with  no  responsiveness  to  the  cycle  at all.  This  pattern  occurs  both  among  the 
poor  and  the  near  poor  in both  of  the  bottom  two  deciles. 
Table  15 investigated  the changes  in total  earnings  among  family  unit  heads 
in the  different  income  categories,  decomposing  earnings  changes  into  the  amount 
due  to  changes  in  weeks  of  work,  changes  in  the  probability  of  working,  and 
changes  in the  weekly  wage.2g  Comparisons  are  made  of  the  changes  in  aggregate 
earnings  between  1963-69  and  1983-89.30 
Patterns  across  the  income  groups  are  strikingly  different.  Among  the 
bottom  two  deciles,  weeks  of  work  and  the  probability  of  working  actually  fell 
over  the  196Os,  so that  all  of the  increase  in earnings  over  this  time  period  is 
due  to  the  rise  in  real  weekly  wages  for  these  groups.  Over  the  198Os,  the 
opposite  pattern  is  visible.  Real  wages  fall  over  the  1980s  in  the  bottom 
decile,  while  expansions  in weeks  of work  account  for much  the  increase  in earned 
income.  The net  result  among  these  bottom  two  groups  is a change  in heads'  total 
earnings  that  is  almost  identical  in  both  periods,  although  arising  from  very 
different  mechanisms.  Among  the  second  quintile,  the  comparison  is not  quite  so 
striking,  but  the  pattern  is  similar.  Expansions  in weeks  of  work  account  for 
far  more  of  the  earnings  increase  in  the  1980s  compared  to  the  196Os,  and 
21 expansions  in  real  wages  account  for  substantially  less. 
Among  the  3rd  and  4th  quintiles,  there  is  little  difference  between  the 
1960s  and  the  1980s  in  the  decomposition  of  earned  income  changes,  although 
aggregate  income  changes  were  lower  in the  1980s.  There  is  some  evidence  that 
weeks  expanded  faster  in  the  198Os,  while  the  probability  of  working  expanded 
faster  in  the  1960s.  Among  the  top  quintile,  increases  in  real  wages  are  the 
dominant  cause  of income  increases  in the  196Os,  but  expansion  in the probability 
of working  is also  important.  In the  198Os,  the  entire  rise  in earnings  is due 
to  expansion  in  weekly  wages.  Indeed,  for  the  top  quintile,  labor  market 
involvement  decreases  slightly  over  the  1980s. 
\ 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
This  paper  has  focussed  on  changes  in poverty  rates  and  in  income  growth 
among  low-income  family  units  over  the economic  expansion  of the  1980s.  Poverty 
was  surprisingly  "sticky"  over  this  time  period,  declining  far more  slowly  than 
previous  experience  would  have  indicated.  The  similarity  between  the  sustained 
economic  expansion  of the  1960s  and the  sustained  economic  expansion  of the  1980s 
provides  an interesting  comparison  period  to use  in asking  the  question  "why  did 
the  expansion  of  the  1980s  have  such  a small  affects  on  the  poverty  rate?" 
My evidence  shows  that most  of the decline  in the  responsiveness  of poverty 
to macroeconomic  growth  was not a phenomenon  of changing  composition  of the poor, 
either  with  regard  to  demographic  composition  or  regional  composition.  Nor  was 
it due to policy  changes  in anti-poverty  programs,  or to the exclusion  of in-kind 
income  in  the  measurement  of poverty.  The  slower  income  growth  among  families 
at the  bottom  of the  income  distribution  was  almost  entirely  due  to a decline  in 
the  responsiveness  of earnings  among  family  unit  heads  to  the  macroeconomy.  In 
turn,  this  decline  in earnings  responsiveness  was  almost  entirely  due  to the lack 
of responsiveness  of real  wages  to the macroeconomic  growth  of the  1980s.  It was 
not  all  due  to  lower  labor  market  involvement;  in fact,  labor  market  involvement 
was  more  responsive  to  the  expansion  of  the  1980s  among  low-income  households 
than  it  was  during  the  1960s. 
It  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  paper  to  investigate  the  underlying  causes 
22 of the  changing  wage  structure  in this  country.  Other  research  has  investigated 
the  effects  of  changes  in  unionization,  changes  in  technology,  changes  in 
international  markets  and  their  effects  on  labor  demand,  and  changes  in  the 
relative  supply  of  more  and  less-skilled  workers  relative  to  rapidly  growing 
demand  for  labor  market  skills  by employers.  There  is evidence  that  all  of these 
issues  seem  to  be  correlated  with  the  changing  wage  opportunities  for  low-wage 
workers. 
The  final  conclusion  of  this  paper  is  not  a  promising  one  for  policy 
makers:  The  impact  of economic  growth  on poverty  has  substantially  declined  in 
this  country  during  the  past  decade.  Even  seven  years  of  sustained  economic 
, 
expansion  did  little  to  significantly  lower  the  poverty  rate  or  increase  income 
among  low-income  families.  Unfortunately,  other  tools  for  reducing  poverty  are 
far  less  appealing:  They  involve  focussed  programs,  that  require  large 
administrative  organization  and  effort.  They  are  also  politically  difficult  to 
sustain  at a high  level,  since  upper  income  groups  tend  to experience  their  costs 
directly  through  increased  taxes,  and  their  benefits  only  very  indirectly.  In 
contrast,  a  reduction  in  poverty  due  to  economic  growth  (often  referred  to  as 
"trickling  down")  always  promised  that  we  could  have  it all:  We  could  decrease 
poverty  at  the  same  time  that  we  all  became  richer.  Unfortunately,  if  the 
changing  wage  patterns  of the  1980s  continue  into the  future,  economic  growth  can 
no  longer  be  relied  upon  as  an effective  weapon  in  future  wars  against  poverty. 
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25 FOOTNOTES 
1.  See Juhn,  Murphy,  and Pierce  (1989),  Blackburn,  Bloom,  and  Freeman  (1990), 
and  Karoly  (1990). 
2.  Slight  differences  in  the  results  reported  in  table  1 and  in  table  8.1  of 
Blank  and  Blinder  are  due  to  minor  data  revisions  and  a  slightly  different 
measure  of  inflation. 
3.  Official  poverty  numbers  for  most  demographic  groups  are  available  back  to 
1959. 
4.  This  is consistent  with  evidence  in Blank  (1989),  based  on  a different  data 
set. 
5.  Ideally,  one  would  like  to use  the  first  seven  years  of the  1960s  expansion, 
rather  than  starting  in the  second  year,  to  compare  to  the  first  seven  years  of 
the  1980s  expansion.  Much  of  the  empirical  work  of  this  paper,  however,  uses 
data  that  is  not  available  before  1963. 
6.  Of  course,  there  are  real  differences  in the  economic  environment  of  these 
periods  as  well.  The  difficult  economic  times  of  the  1970s  and  early  1980s 
resulted  in  very  different  expectations  and  fear  in  1983  than  were  present  in 
1963.  In addition,  the  more  competitive  international  trade  environment  of the 
1980s  affected  the  U.S.  economy  in  that  decade  much  more  than  did  the 
international  economy  of  the  1960s. 
7.  For  the  most  comprehensive  recent  discussion  of  this  issue,  see  Ruggles 
(1990). 
8.  In-kind  income  involves  the provision  of goods  and  services  rather  than  cash. 
The  largest  in-kind  program  for  low-income  households  is medicaid,  followed  by 
food  stamps  and  then  housing  subsidies.  There  are  also  a  host  of  relatively 
small  in-kind  programs,  such  as  school  lunch  and  breakfast  subsidies  or  low- 
income  energy  assistance. 
9.  A wide  variety  of cost-control  measures  were  implemented  in medicaid  program 
in  the  early-to-mid  1980s  to  control  medicaid  budgets. 
26 10.  Imputing  medical  services  as part  of  family  income  also  has  the  problematic 
effect  of making  the  very  ill  appear  better  off  than  the  healthy. 
11.  Unfortunately,  after  1987  the  Bureau  of the  Census  changed  the  way  in which 
they  do  these  estimates;  the  estimates  currently  available  for  1988  and  1989  are 
not  consistent  with  the  earlier  series.  Data  to  calculate  consistent  estimates 
will  be  available  from  the  Census  at  some  point  in the  future. 
12.  Numbers  provided  by  William  Wascher,  at  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  of 
Governors. 
13.  One  effect  of  using  family  units  as  the  unit  of  observation  is  that  my 
poverty  counts  do not match  anything  published  by the  Bureau  of the  Census.  The 
Census  reports  the  total  number  of individuals  living  in households  whose  income 
is  below  the  poverty  line,  the  total  number  of  families  (family  units  with  at 
least  two  members)  below  the  poverty  line,  and  the  total  number  of  unrelated 
individuals  below  the  poverty  line,  My  poverty  count  is  a  combination  of  the 
latter  two  statistics.  Calculating  equivalent  poverty  definitions  from  my  data 
as  are  reported  in  the  Census  publications  results  in  virtually  identical 
numbers. 
14.  The  income  data  from  these  tapes  is  for  the  preceding  year. 
15.  The poverty  gap  is the  average  difference  among  all poor  between  family  unit 
income  and  the  poverty  line.  It  shows  how  far  below  the  poverty  line  poor 
families  are  on  average. 
16.  For  instance,  it  includes  such  items  as general  assistance  and  foster  care 
funds. 
17.  This  is  a  standard  result  in  such  simulations.  There  is  substantial 
underreporting  of  government  public  assistance  income  among  recipients. 
18.  For  the  results  in  the  remainder  of  this  paper,  I  use  the  Mare-Winship 
extracts  of  the  March  CPS  for  1964  through  1988.  For  1989  and  1990,  I created 
comparable  extracts  from  the  complete  CPS  tapes. 
19.  This  calculation  assumes  there  is independence  between  the  poverty  rate  of 
a  group  and  its  share  of  the  population.  If  poverty  rates  change  as  the 
27 population  share  changes,  due to changing  selectivity  into a certain  family,  type 
then  the  calculations  in  table  9 are  too  simple. 
20.  In the  first  three  groups,  in most  cases  the  "other  relatives"  are children, 
but  in  some  cases  they  are  parents,  siblings,  grandchildren  or  more  distant 
relatives.  "Living  alone"  means  living  without  other  relatives.  These  family 
units  could  be  living  with  other  unrelated  family  units. 
21.  There  are  no  intercept  terms  included  in  equation  1.  Because  it  is  a 
regression  of changes  on changes,  an intercept  term  for each  period  wouldmeasure 
underlying  trends.  But  such  trends  may  be  related  to  the  nature  of  economic 
growth  over  each  period,  and  I  probably  want  to  subsume  them  ,into  the 
coefficients  on  GNP  change.  As  it turns  out,  in  the  results  reported  in  table 
10  and  in  later  tables  in  the  paper,  it  makes  little  difference  whether 
intercepts  are  included  or  excluded;  the  same  conclusions  will  emerge.  I 
therefore,  exclude  intercepts  from  all  reported  results  to  preserve  degrees  of 
freedom. 
22.  All  regressions  in this  paper  rely  on the  percent  change  in real  GNP  as the 
primary  independent  variable.  Much  of  this  work  has  been  duplicated  using  the 
change  in  unemployment  rates  instead.  The  conclusions  are  identical. 
23.  Realize  that  table  10  uses  the  level  change  in  poverty  as  the  dependent 
variable.  Had  I instead  used  the  percentage  change  --  as  shown  in  table  2  -- 
female  heads  would  have  been  among  the  least  responsive  and married  couples  among 
the  most  responsive,  because  the  differences  in  the  levels  of  their  underlying 
poverty  rates. 
24.  There  is not  a consistent  earnings  series  available  for this  entire  period. 
The  definition  of earnings  changes  slightly  between  1966  and  1967.  Essentially, 
earnings  prior  to  1967  are  calculated  as  a  residual  and  are  several  thousand 
dollars  higher  than  after  1967,  when  persons  are  asked  their  annual  earnings 
directly.  As a result,  the change  in earnings  between  these  two years  is omitted 
by  including  a dummy  variable  for this  observation  in all  regressions  for head's 
and  spouse's  earnings  and  for  other  income  (which  is  constructed  using  total 
income  minus  earnings.) 
28 25.  In later  years,  more  disaggregate  categories  can be tabulated,  but  for this 
entire  time  period,  it  is  difficult  to  consistently  construct  any  additional 
income  components. 
26.  The  early  years  of  CPS  data  do  not  provide  information  on  exact  weeks  of 
work  last  year,  but  only  provide  a categorical  variable.  The  midpoint  of  each 
category  is used  as an estimate  of weeks  in that  category  for each  individual  and 
these  categories  are  used  for  all  year  (even  those  where  specifics  weeks  are 
available)  in  order  to  create  a  consistent  series.  The  result  is  to  reduce 
variation  in the  microdata  in this  variable.  Table  13, however,  uses  the  means 
for different  groups  as the  dependent  variable  and  these  means  are probably  less  , 
affected  by  the  categorical  nature  of  the  variable. 
27.  I have  no  information  on hours  worked  per  week  in the  early  years  of the  CPS 
(except  whether  the  work  was  part-time  or  not.) 
28.  Recall that  a consistent  series  in weeks  is available  only  as a categorical 
variable. 
29.  The  decomposition  in  table  15  is based  on  the  equation 
(2)  AEarnings,,,_,  =  AWeeks,,,_,  *  ProbWk,  * Wages,  + 
AProbWk,,,_, * Weeks,_, * Wages,  + 
A  Wages,,,_,  * Weeks,_, * ProbWkt_l 
Other  decompositions  are  possible,  but  give  similar  results. 
30.  Because  of  a break  in  the  earnings  series  between  1966  and  1967,  earnings 
pre-1967  have  to  be  adjusted.  I  do  this  by  calculating  an  estimate  1966-67 
change  based  on  the  GNP  growth  in  that  year  and  the  coefficient  on  GNP  growth 
over  the  1960s  expansion.  I then  "backcast"  from  this  (lower)  number  for  1966, 
using  the  actual  reported  annual  percent  changes  in  the  earnings  between  1964, 
1965,  and  1966. 
29 Table  1 
EFFECT  OF  MACROECONOMIC  VARIABLES  ON  POVERTY 
Dependent  Variable  = Poverty  Rate 
(Based  on  earlier  work  reported  in Blank  and  Blinder,  1986) 
Constant 




Poverty  line/ 
Mean  income 
Govt  transfers/ 
GNP 
Lag  Poverty 
Rate 
Dummy  Var 
(1983-89=1) 
Male  UR  * 
Dummy  Var 
Gov  Trans/GNP  * 
Dummy  Var 
Adjusted  R-sqr 
Number  of  Obs 
1959-  1959- 
1983  1989 




















































Steady  State  Effect  on  the  Poverty  Rate  of  a One-point  Rise  in: 
Male  UR  .984  .270  974  (1959-82) 
421  (1983-89) 
Inflation  .124  .038  .115 
Trans/GNP  -.448  1.007  -.442  (1959-82) 
1.576  (1983-89) 
Standard  errors  in parentheses. Constant 
Percent  Change 






Number  of  Obs 
Table  2 
EFFECT  OF MACROECONOMIC  GROWTH  IN THE  POVERTY  RATE 
OF  DIFFERENT  GROUPS  AMONG  THE  POOR 



































































Standard  errors  in parentheses. 
Source  of  poverty  rates:  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of  the  Census, 
Money  Income  and  Poverty  Status  in  the  U.S.,  1989,  Current  Population  Reports, 
Series  P-60,  No.  168,  September  1990. 













23 Table  3 
COMPARATIVE  MACROECONOMIC  STATISTICS  DURING  THE 
EXPANSIONS  OF  THE  1960s  AND  1980s 
Percent  change  in 
Real  Gross  National 
Product  (GNP) 
1963-69  1983-89 
(1)  (2) 
+34.7%  t30.1iij 
Civilian  Unemployment 
Rate 
Inflation  Rate" 
-37.0%  -45.3% 
+24.8%  i-26.3% 
a GNP  Deflator Table  4 
CEANGES  IN FOOD  STAMP  AND  MEDICAID  ASSISTANCE, 
1979-1989 
Food  Stamps 
Monthly  Benefits 








Percent  Change 
1979-  1983- 
1983  1989 
(4)  (5) 
$46.90  $53.30  $51.90  +13.6%  -2.6% 
Medicaid 
Medicaid  Expenditures 
divided  by  Number  of 
Recipients 
($1989,  using  the  CPI 
for  medical  services) 
$2236  $2407  $2547  +7.6%  +5.8% 
Source:  Committee  on Ways  and  Means,  U.S. 
Book,  June  1990. 
House  of Representatives,  1990  Green 
(Appendix  L,  tables  9,  11,  and  12.) Table  5 
COMPARATIVE  CHANGES  IN OFFICIAL  POVERTY  AND  POVERTY  INCLUDING 











Including  Including 
In-kind  In-kind  Income 
Income:  Food,  Hsg  & 
Food  & Hsq  Medical 
(2)  (3) 
10.0  8.9 
14.1  12.8 




t3.5  t4.1  +3.9 
-1.7  -1.7  -i.8 
Percent  Change: 
1979-83  t29.9  t41.0  +43.8 
1983-87  -11.2  -12.1  -14.1 
Data  Source:  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of  the  Census,  Estimates  of 
Poverty  Includins  the Value  of Noncash  Benefits,  1987,  Technical  Paper  58, August 
1988. Table  6 
REGIONAL  DISTRIBUTION  OF  POOR  AND  NON-POOR  FAMILY 
1979  1989 
%Non-  %Non- 
New  England  4.7  5.7  3.1  5.7 
Mid  Atlantic  16.1  17.2  13.3  15.9 
East  North  Central  14.9  19.5  15.5  17.7 
West  North  Central  6.4  7.9  6.4  7.5 
South  Atlantic  18.7  15.2  17.5  17.0 
East  South  Central  9.9  6.0  10.0  5.8 
West  South  Central  13.0  9.7  15.5  10.0 
Mountain  4.5  4.8  5.5  5.4 
Pacific  11.7  13.9  13.1  14.9 
% Poor  Poor  %Poor  Poor 
Chi-Squared  test  of  whether  g-region  distribution  of  poor 
identical 
(10%  significance  level:  x2 = 14.7) 
1979  x2-value 
6.5 
1989  8.4 
Chi-squared  test  of  whether  51-state  distribution  of  poor 
identical 
(10%  significance  level:  X2 = 63.2) 
1979  X2-value 
11.0 
1989  12.5 
Source:  CPS  data,  March  1979  & 1989. 
Region  Definitions: 
New  England:  CN,MA,ME,NH,RI,VT 
Mid  Atlantic:  NJ,NY,PA 
East  North  Central:  IL,IN,MI,OH,WI 
West  North  Central:  IA,KA,MN,MO,NE,ND,SD 
South  Atlantic:  DE,DC,FL,GA,MY,NC,SC,VA,WV 
East  South  Central:  AL,KT,MS,TN 
West  South  Central:  AR,LA,OK,TX 
Mountain:  AZ,CO,ID,MT,NV,NM,UT,WY 
Pacific:  AK,CA,HA,OR,WA 
UNITS 
and  non-poor  are 
and  non-poor  are Table  I 
URBAN  LOCATION  OF  POOR  AND  NON-POOR  FAMILY  UNITS 
1964 
1970 
Share  of  the  Poor  Share  of  the  Non-Poor 
Living  in  Living  in 
Central  Remainder  Central  Remainder 
City  of  SMSA  City  of  SMSA 
32.8  17.9  35.3  35.0 
33.9  20.8  31.7  36.3 
1980  36.9  23.0  27.7  37.4 
1990  35.2  22.9  25.2  38.1 
Source:  CPS  data.  Note  the  data  are  not  strictly  comparable  across  years. 
Starting  in  1977,  a category  "not  identified"  is added  and  the  population  share 
in the  category  grows  over  time. Table  8 
EFFECT  ON  POVERTY  RATES  OF  HOLDING  AFDC 
RULES  CONSTANT  AT  1979  LEVEL 
1978 
Actual  Simltd 
1978  1978 
(1)  (2) 
1.  All  Family  Units 
Percent  on  AFDCa  5.0  3.7 
Dollars  of  AFDC  among 
recipients  $4173  $5732 
Poverty  Rate  13.5  13.5 
Poverty  Gap  $3297  $2885 
2.  Female-headed  families  with  children 
Percent  on  AFDCa  37.6  36.7 
Dollars  of  AFDC  among 
recipients  $4952  $5735 
Poverty  Rate  42.1  42.1 
Poverty  Gap  $4620  $3451 
____-__-__-__-_--------_--_-----_------------- 
Simulations  based  on  CPS  data,  March  1979  & 1989. 
1988 






















Simltd  w/ 










a  Actual  data  based  on those  reporting  public  assistance  income,  a somewhat  more 
inclusive  category  than  AFDC. Table  9 
EFFECT  OF  DEMOGRAPHIC  CHANGE  ON 





With  '64  Change  in 
Population  Poverty  Due 
Actual  Change  Weights  to  Changing 
in Pov  Rate  Constant  Demographics 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
-8.42  -11.15  2.73 
-7.03  -7.91  0.88 
1969-1979  -1.76  -3.15  1.39 
1979-1989  0.46 
Data  calculated  from  the  March  CPS,  1964-1989.  Six demographic  groups  are used: 
Single  females  with  other  relatives,  Single  males  with  other  relatives,  Single 
female  living  alone,  Single  males  living  alone,  Married  couples  with  other 
relatives,  and  Married  couples  living  alone. Table  10 
RESPONSIVENESS  OF  POVERTY  RATES  AMONG  DIFFERENT 
GROUPS  TO  REAL  GNP  GROWTH 
Dependent  Variable: 
All  Family  Units 
Single  Females 
w/  Other  Relatives 
Single  Males 
w/  Other  Relatives 
Married  Couples 
w/  Other  Relatives 
Married  Couples 
Living  Alone 
Single  Females 
Living  Alone 
Single  Males 
Living  Alone 
Data  with  constant 
population  weights" 
Change  in  Share 
of  Family  Units 
Below  Pov  Line 
Coefficient  on 
Percent  Change  in 
Real  GNP 
1963-69  1983-89 
(1)  (2) 
-.26  -.09 
l.05)  t.051 
-.30  -.16 
t.1.21  t.131 
-.13  -.08 
t.171  (.17) 
-.23  -.09 
t.06)  t.06) 
-.21  -.06 
t.08)  t.08) 
-.44  -.19 
l.12)  (.13) 
-.38  -.12 
t.08)  l.08) 
-.27  -.lO 
t.051  t.06) 
Standard  errors  in parenthesis. 
a  Based  on  six  family  groups  indicated  above. 
Change  in  Share 
of  Family  Units 
Below  Twice  Pov  Line 
Coefficient  on 
Percent  Change  in 
Real  GNP 
1963-69  1983-89 
































(.ll) Table  11 
DECREASED  RESPONSIVENESS  OF  POVERTY  RATE 
TO  GNP  GROWTH:  SIMULATED  EFFECTS 
Fitted  Change 
in  Poverty  Rate 
1983-1989 
(1) 
Expected  Change 
in  Poverty  Rate  if 
1960s  Responsiveness 
Had  Continued 
(2) 
(1)  All  Family  Units  -2.17 
If demographic  composition  had 
remained  unchanged  at  1964  weights 
(2)  All  Family  Units  -2.41 
-6.05 
-6.12 
Decreased  responsiveness 
of  poverty  over  expansion  of  80s: 
(Row  1, Column  2 - Column  1)  -3.88 
Decreased  responsiveness 
if population  weights  constant: 
(Row 2,  Column  2 - Column  1)  -3.71 
Decrease  in  responsiveness  due  to 
changing  demographics;  -0.17  (4.4%) .:......;\,,.,:-5:.1.  .  .,.  ” 























RESPONSIVENESS  OF INCOME COMPONENTS  AMONG FAMILY UNITS TO 
REAL  GNP  GROWTH 
Total 
Dependent  Variable 




Coeffic  on 
83-89 
(1) 
Pet Change  in 
(2) 
194  166 








235  181 
(46)  (46) 
348  473 




83-89  -- 
Coeffic on 
(3) 
Pet Chanqe in 
(4) 
118  70 
(33)  (34) 
30  8 
(8)  (8) 
(:z,  (Z, 
120 
(43)  & 
144 
(50)  (57:) 
196  150 
(83)  (84) 
Earninqs 
Coeffic on 
Pet Change in 
Real GNP 
63-69  83-89 








Coeffic  on 
Pet Chanoe in 
Real-GNP 
63-69  83-89 
(7)  (8) 
'  34  -5 
(17)  (17) 
-8 
(20) 
33  33 
(30)  (30) 
102  135 
(89)  (89) 
stanclara  errors  In parencnesis. 





















RESPONSIVENESS  OF  LABOR  MARKET  INDICATORS  FOR  HEADS  OF 




Prob of  Weeks 
Last Year 
Coeffic  on 
Employment 
Pet Change  in 
Last Year 
Coeffic on 
Pet Change in 
Worked 
Last Year 
Coeffic  on 
Pet Change  in 
Real GNP 
63-69  83-89 
(5)  (6) 
Prob of 
Part-time 
Emo Last Yr 
Coeffic on 
Pet Change in 
Real-GNP  Real-GNP 
63-69  83-89  --  63-69  83-89 















-.08  -.ll 




























































63-69  83-89 





























Standard errors  in parentheses. 
: Table  14 
RESPONSIVENESS 




















OF  WEEKLY  WAGES  FOR  HEADS  OF  FAMILY  UNITS  TO 
REAL  GNE'  GROWTH 
Dependent  Variable: 
Weekly  Wages 
Coefficient  on 
Percent  Change 
in Real  GNP 
1963-69  1983-89 





























Standard  errors  in parentheses. 1963-69 
Aggregate Change 
in Earnings of 
Family Unit Head 










in Earnings of 
Family Unit Head 









DECOMPOSITION  OF  THE CHANGE  IN EARNINGS AMONG FAMILY UNIT HEADS 





First  Second  Second  Third  Fourth  Top 
Decile  Decile  Quint  Quint  Quint  Quint 
(2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
$3228  $276  $705  $1940  $3193  $4279  $5844 
4.1  -24.7  -10.3  9.0  9.7  0.8  4.0 
23.5  -35.5  12.8  30.0  23.9  25.3  33.7 
72.4  160.2  97.5  61.0  66.4  '  73.8  62.2 
$1816  $235  $772  $914  $1550  $2195  $3860 





32.8  25.9  8.5  11.4  -3.3 
57.5  7.1  28.0  62.0  73.8  105.6 FIGURE 1 
Predicted  vs  Actual  Poverty  Rates 
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